COLUMN | Beijing’s evolving multi-pronged strategy in the South China Sea [Naval Gazing]

China’s headlong maritime expansionism depends heavily upon achieving dominance of the South China Sea (SCS) and its environs. This dominance demands the establishment of control of many areas of the sea that are currently claimed by other nations.

Beijing’s chosen tools to negate such claims are the patrol assets of the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the “fishing vessels” of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). Over the past decade, these forces have established a massive presence in the SCS. Now, they are targeting a significant number of specific areas for intensive operations that involve the establishment of a permanent or near-permanent presence of Chinese government vessels with the aim of ensuring long-term Chinese control.

Recent months have also seen Beijing stepping up its encroachment on the islands governed by Taiwan.

Tactics being used include the harassment of fishing vessels and Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) patrol ships escorting garrison resupply convoys, and the deployment of PAFMM craft en masse to raft up and obstruct entry into and egress from the targeted area.

The reach, expansion, and persistence of China’s proactive operations in the SCS are not widely appreciated. Particularly active in these operations are the Zhongyu, Zhongtao, and Jingdao class patrol ships of the CCG. These converted corvettes each have a warship profile and mount highly visible, medium-calibre fixed armament.

Recent reports indicate that PAFMM craft are adopting the CCG colour scheme, and this is leading to speculation that the two forces might be heading for a merger.

An outline of these operations follows. The targeted areas are claimed by the Philippines unless otherwise stated:

Vanguard Bank

There have been regular prolonged incursions by CCG vessels into the seas around this Vietnamese-claimed area, which is adjacent to seabed oil and gas reserves.

Scarborough Shoal

Large-scale harassment of fishing vessels and swarming by CCG and PAFMM vessels have been reported here. According to some recent reports, CCG vessels have established a permanent presence within the shoal’s lagoon.

Thitu Island

Continuous loitering offshore presence and swarming by CCG and PAFMM vessels have been reported here.

Second Thomas Shoal

There have been regular serious harassment of Philippine resupply convoys headed to the observation post of the old Philippine Navy landing ship Sierra Madre. This is despite the presence of escorting PCG vessels.

Luconia Shoal

There have been regular prolonged incursions by CCG vessels into the seas around this Malaysia-claimed feature, which is near seabed oil reserves.

Iroquois Reef

Fishing vessel crews operating near the reef have reported harassment by CCG ships.

Reed Bank

Regular harassment of fishing vessels has been reported here.

Commodore Reef

There was a recent harassment of a Philippine garrison resupply vessel by a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) corvette.

Matsu and Kinmen Islands

This year has seen separate confrontations between a Chinese fishing vessel and a Taiwan Coast Guard Administration patrol boat, and between a CCG patrol vessel and a Taiwanese ferry.

This Taiwan-claimed island group lies very close to the Chinese mainland, and so there is a history of serious conflict over the islands. However, they are a useful trade conduit, and from 1970 until now, Taipei and Beijing had been careful to keep the subject on the back burner.

Penghu Island

Incursions into the Taiwan Strait by Chinese warships have been a regular feature here over the past two years. However, recent months have seen the establishment of a CCG presence off this heavily garrisoned, Taipei-claimed island, which is strategically located relatively proximate to the main island of Taiwan.

International countermeasures

Backing up recent warnings to Beijing from Washington, this year’s iteration of the annual US-Philippines Balikatan exercises is on a significantly larger scale than usual. In an indication of Europe’s renewed interest in maintaining international freedom of navigation in the SCS, the exercise includes a French warship (the frigate Vendemiaire) for the first time.

The exercise is attracting close attention from the frigate Huangshan and an electronic surveillance ship, both of the PLA-N.

Also, Beijing has already objected to plans for a flotilla of 100 Philippine fishing vessels to undertake passage to Scarborough Shoal on May 15, 2024.

Additionally, German and Japanese warships are scheduled to take part in the forthcoming Asia-Pacific RIMPAC exercises, while a UK Royal Navy Carrier Strike Group is due to deploy to the region in 2025.

Meanwhile, US Marines are rehearsing “island hopping” tactics as a response to possible escalation in the SCS, while US special forces have been installed on Kinmen, Matsu, and Penghu as part of a “tripwire” strategy, while American Typhon anti-aircraft missiles have been deployed to the Philippines to join the Brahmos anti-ship missiles recently supplied by India.

In another significant development, Taipei has announced that, in 2026, a Littoral Command will be set up and tasked with deploying drones and small attack craft to counter a possible invasion of Taiwan by Beijing’s forces.

Tensions in and around the SCS seem certain to ratchet up, although it remains to be seen how far China will push its claims in the face of the increasing international focus on the situation.