COLUMN | Assessing the need for remote pilotage and "sea traffic controllers" [Grey Power]
It was many years ago that an eminent ship owner, possibly in the aftermath of a near-miss or collision involving one of his ships, asked why the strict and effective control regime that prevents aircraft bumping into each other could not be “marinised,” that is, applied to ships.
Communication is good enough, he reasoned and the sea controllers would only be dealing with a single dimension.
It is one of those ideas that seems superficially attractive, but on closer inspection revealed all sorts of difficulties. As I recall, the one mountain that would have to be climbed centred around liability, which was said would prevent any sort of shoreside directors assuming responsibility for the direction (as opposed to advice) of ships in their area of responsibility.
When the suggestion comes up from time to time, as it has, it is the reluctance to empower a VTS operator to tell the master of a ship what to do that has kept the idea in the “too hard” basket.
So, it was interesting to read the other day that a scheme is being launched in the Kattegat between the Danish authorities and the DanPilot organisation, for what is described as “remote pilotage” in these busy waters that funnel all the traffic to and from the Baltic.
The operators are going to be very particular to make this facility available only to selected ships, and one might be very certain that the selection will be thorough. It is suggested the advantages are several, but clearly it will make the life of the pilot, trying to get on and off ships in filthy weather, somewhat safer, if the pilotage can be undertaken from ashore.
Presumably, unlike the case with their counterparts directing aircraft, the system will remain with the ship, “manoeuvring under master’s orders and pilot’s advice,” as the log books like to state. It will be thus quite wrong wrong to define those in the control centre ashore as “sea traffic controllers.”
We have been here before on several occasions, with pilots themselves invariably raising the various snags they see in such transference of pilotage from the bridge of the ship to a shoreside station.
Apart from the old chestnut of remote pilotage merely playing into the hands of ship operators who dislike paying for pilots (what have we got masters for?), there are a lot of very cogent arguments that are regularly voiced when such controversies arise.
It is a very good argument that with many ships, the pilot, when boarding, does not really know what will be met with when walking into the wheelhouse. It will be hoped that the bridge “team” will be on the ball, efficient and smart, and the ship in fine fettle.
But alas, any experienced pilot will probably be unsurprised when all such hope leads to disappointment and it is revealed that the “team” consists of an exhausted master, who barely speaks any known language but is just able to convey the intelligence that the engine may not go astern, only one anchor is available, and the radar is broken.
How is a shoreside agency expected to pilot the ship into port without knowing exactly what is going on in the bridge and elsewhere aboard that ship beyond what might be revealed in a VHF conversation? We can be very sure that the Danish operation in the Kattegat will be closely monitored and that only “Rolls-Royce” tonnage will be handled in such a fashion.
It will be also interesting to find out what masters really think about remote pilotage, because in so many lean-manned ships today, the presence of the pilot is a huge blessing to people who are seriously stressed and overwhelmed with other tasks than that of handling the ship.
But will they be asked? We must just wait and see, but one might forecast that there will be pressure elsewhere, not least from clever equipment designers, who seem to love easing human beings out of the equation.
Or is that just too cynical?
