As America’s European allies digest the diplomatic fallout of their spat with the Trump administration over their inaction on Iran, the US Army in Europe has kept pushing forward with its training programme for the year in several nervous nations on NATO’s eastern flank.
The next phase of activity, known by the US military as Exercise Sword 26, sees more than 15,000 NATO personnel – more than a third of them American – engage in activities ranging from cyber drills to armoured and infantry attacks from the Nordic region to the Black Sea.
Yet plenty of European states are reappraising the US as a partner, alarmed by leaks and briefings from within the Trump administration that have suggested punishing allies on the continent for perceived disloyalty.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz responded by saying Washington had been “humiliated” by its failure to bring Iran to heel, telling school students the administration had entered the conflict without a plan and was now unable to extricate itself.
On Wednesday, Trump posted that Washington was, “studying and reviewing,” reducing its troop contingent in Germany – although whether such forces might return to the US or be moved to eastern Europe was initially unclear.
European insiders describe that as another sign of an increasingly unpredictable dynamic, with uniformed officials at US European Command talking up commitment and cooperation just as the White House, State Department and Pentagon leaders do the opposite.
Last week, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk told the Financial Times that Europe's "biggest, most important question is if the United States is ready to be as loyal as it is described in our (NATO) treaties. The question is if NATO is still an organisation ready, politically and logistically, to react - for example, against Russia if they try to attack."
That danger, he said, could come within “months rather than years”. Although most European officials and analysts say the immediate threat remains primarily of sabotage, subversion and drone incursions, few would rule out direct Russian aggression, especially if fighting in Ukraine were to end, and Moscow were to sense a moment of opportunity in NATO's troubles.
One European diplomat bemoaned a rhetorical approach by the White House, in particular since the US and Israel attacked Iran on February 28. They present European nations as letting down their historic US protectors, not only by failing to join in but also in several cases by denying the US access to their airspace and air bases.
Asked by Reuters at the start of April whether he was considering quitting NATO, Trump replied: “Wouldn’t you, if you were me?” Secretary of State Marco Rubio, until recently an outspoken supporter of NATO, is now also a harsh critic.
While US detachments such as the dozen-plus M1A1 main battle tanks in Estonia and much larger formations in Poland, Germany, Romania and elsewhere continue their activity, European partners wonder how long that might continue.
European and US officials say the administration is pursuing a policy of “rewarding” those European nations it sees as making sufficient effort themselves, particularly the Baltic states and Poland. Those around Trump have also pushed allies hard to buy American weaponry, both for Ukraine and themselves.
Yet US missile consumption in the Middle East has put back the delivery of weapons systems already paid for, including Javelin anti-tank missiles and HIMARS long-range rockets, to countries such as Estonia for months or even years.
"We must understand the US is currently involved in a conflict and is trying to stock itself and ensure that it is prepared if this war lasts longer," said Estonian Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur. "On the other hand, it is not in their interest to damage allied ties nor lose (undermine) confidence in their defence industry, such that no one would buy from them in the future."
Much as Europe might wish to wean itself off reliance on American weaponry, it is far from making that a reality.
Manufacturer Rheinmetall said this month that Germany was now producing well over a million artillery rounds a year, considerably outpacing the US. But visions of how Europe should be defended - the relative importance of heavy weaponry compared to high-tech surveillance and light, nimble, rapidly developing systems made by small enterprises - vary widely.
Even though drones have largely driven heavy armour from the battlefield in Ukraine, Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger last month triggered an angry backlash there when he said many of its weapons were built by “housewives”.
Then there is the question of procurement coordination, standardisation and scale. European countries have traditionally competed, not cooperated, in this area, but EU Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius, a Lithuanian, this week suggested non-members Ukraine, Norway and Britain should all join with the European Union in a defence-industrial pact.
Policy alignment, too, is ad hoc at best. European NATO powers may agree less and less with the Atlantic alliance's pre-eminent power, but the European Union has no defence arm. And Europe's biggest military power, Britain, is not an EU member.
European nations are still discussing whether to send warships to the Persian Gulf or peacekeepers to Ukraine in the event of conflict ceasing in either theatre, while Britain has announced it will lead a new group of navies patrolling the Arctic and Atlantic.
It means already-scarce resources will be spread considerably thinner, and the dependence on US military logistics, intelligence and, in a crisis, firepower will not lessen, for now at least. One European diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Europe was still, "not seeing the sense of urgency we need”.
US officials in Europe say current US-led military drills are now aimed specifically at expanding European capabilities, including the ability to set up secure computing networks and conduct complex operations that combine jets, special forces and unmanned systems to support long-range missile strikes.
The commander of the US Army Europe, Lieutenant General Chris Donahue, is a particular advocate of high-tech approaches, including the use of artificial intelligence for mass targeting.
But it is a US-centric view of how any future European conflict with Russia should be fought and, without the United States, Europe has little ability, for now at least, to wage such a sophisticated conflict. Moreover, some such as Poland see Europe’s ability to mobilise industry and population at scale as the key to deterring Putin and his successors.
Within the Pentagon, another rationale had been quietly developing for a continued presence in Europe: the idea that warplanes and troops could be kept there on standby for future Middle East contingencies.
The refusal of some European nations including Spain to allow airbases to be used for the war with Iran, however, has somewhat dented that approach. One memo written by the Pentagon’s number three official, Elbridge Colby, and described to Reuters, specifically raised the possibility of US measures to expel Spain from NATO and reconsider Washington’s de facto acceptance of British rule over the Falkland Islands, which Argentina claims.
One US official told Reuters the document was intended to reduce the “sense of entitlement” amongst European nations too used to US military protection. Whether it will have the desired effect is another question.
The next major face-off with the Kremlin could be months away, or years. Meanwhile, the next US administration might be friendlier to Europe – or the opposite, and perhaps even more distracted by other corners of the world.
(By Peter Apps, Editing by Kevin Liffey)
