A vessel operating company has pleaded guilty and was sentenced, and the company’s chief engineer was sentenced to pay a fine, following a June 2024 incident where a container vessel caused the evacuation of a large bridge in Charleston, South Carolina, and created a large wake that injured two people, damaged ships and piers, and led to the clearing of local beaches.
MSC Shipmanagement, a vessel operating company, was sentenced to pay a criminal fine of US$6 million and to serve a four-year term of probation for failing to report a hazardous condition on board the containership MSC Michigan VII and to obstructing a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and US Coast Guard investigation.
The US Department of Justice said MSC must also conduct a root-cause analysis of the circumstances relating to the hazardous conditions on board MSC Michigan VII.
MSC’s chief engineer, Fernando San Diego San Juan, was sentenced to pay a US$2,000 fine. He previously pleaded guilty, also for failing to report a hazardous condition and obstructing the investigation.
"The hazardous condition onboard this vessel, and MSC’s failure to report it, could have ended in a fatal bridge strike as occurred months earlier in Baltimore," said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Adam Gustafson of the DOJ's Energy and Natural Resources Division.
"Had MSC Michigan VII been heading into port instead of out to sea, the result would likely have been catastrophic. By their reckless actions, these defendants put a coastal community, critical infrastructure, and the marine environment at risk."
On June 5, 2024, MSC Michigan VII departed from Charleston. The vessel intended to travel up the Cooper River to a turning basin. Once it turned around, it was to proceed down along the Cooper River, beneath the Arthur Ravenel Jr. Bridge, and through Charleston Harbor and out to sea.
The Arthur Ravenel Jr. Bridge is an eight-lane, major thoroughfare that spans two-and-a-half miles (four kilometres) and connects Charleston with Mount Pleasant, South Carolina.
During this outbound transit, the linkage rod disconnected from the vessel’s governor after MSC Michigan VII’s crew made a manual adjustment to it.
The governor regulates engine speed. Because it was not connected to its governor, MSC Michigan VII’s main engine could not be slowed and the vessel sped along at approximately 16 to 17 knots.
The Arthur Ravenel Jr. Bridge was evacuated over concern the vessel could strike the bridge, though the vessel was successfully navigated under the bridge and out to sea. Local beaches were also cleared because of concern that the wake of the ship could cause injuries to people on the beach, and it did injure two people.
The vessel’s wake also damaged ships and piers.
The DOJ said that, in pleading guilty, MSC and San Diego San Juan admitted that, on occasion, the exact revolutions per minute (rpms) ordered by MSC Michigan VII’s bridge telegraph could only be achieved if the length of the linkage rod between the governor and fuel rack was manually adjusted.
Only trained technicians should manually adjust a vessel’s governor and linkage rod, and none of the engineering crew on board MSC Michigan VII were qualified to make the adjustments. Despite this, when the vessel was manoeuvring (entering or departing a port), the engineering crew had to pay attention to the bridge telegraph order that could be seen in the engine control room. As needed, they would go to the governor and manually adjust the length of the linkage rod until the desired rpm was reached.
Additionally, bridge crewmembers would occasionally call the engine control room and request the rpms be raised or lowered to match the telegraph order. San Diego San Juan admitted that he knew that this practice was hazardous because manually adjusting the length of the linkage rod could cause it to fail. Nevertheless, he allowed the practice to continue.
The nuts on both ends of the linkage rod were loosened by the ship's engine department crew so that the rod could be more easily turned to adjust its length and, therefore, the main engine rpms. The system was designed so that on each end of the linkage rod was a locking washer that would hold the nuts in place so they could not back out. However, on MSC Michigan VII, both the upper and lower locking washers were removed and the coast guard found one of the locking washers on the deck beneath the governor.
Both the failure of the engine to achieve the rpms dictated by the bridge telegraph and the manual adjustment to the linkage rod during manoeuvring constituted hazardous conditions that should have been but were not reported to the coast guard.
During their investigation, the coast guard and the NTSB interviewed San Diego San Juan and asked him if the linkage rod was ever adjusted. The DOJ said he lied and said that the crew never adjusted the linkage rod and only a qualified technician would adjust the linkage rod.
The NTSB and the coast guard later interviewed San Diego San Juan again and asked him whether there had been a delay between the bridge telegraph and the main engine response in the past. The DOJ said he again lied and said there had not been. However, when he made that statement, he knew that the governor linkage rod had at previous times been manually adjusted to match the engine order telegraph input that caused a delay for the main engine to reach the desired rpm.
San Diego San Juan was asked again if anyone had ever adjusted the linkage rod and he falsely answered “no.” He also stated that the crew should never adjust the linkage rod and that only a technician should adjust the linkage rod. He was asked whether he knew that the crew were making manual adjustments to the linkage rod and he lied and said that he was unaware.
During the US Coast Guard inspection of MSC Michigan VII after the incident, San Diego San Juan told another crewmember that he had said to the coast guard that he did not see anyone adjust the linkage rod. He told that crewmember and two others to say what he had said to the coast guard so they would be on “the same page.” In doing this, he was attempting to persuade these witnesses not to admit to the coast guard that there had been manual adjustments to the linkage rod.
Coast Guard Sector Charleston, the Coast Guard Investigative Service, and the NTSB investigated the case.
