Investigation reveals crew death on superyacht caused by inadequate safeguards against electrical shock
The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) has released its report on the investigation into the death of a crewmember on the Isle of Man-registered superyacht Baton Rouge on February 23, 2024.
On the morning (local time) of the said date, while the yacht was in Falmouth Harbour in the Caribbean island of Antigua after having lost electrical power, the vessel's chief engineer was electrocuted while working on the engine room ventilation system. The chief engineer's heart could not be restarted and he was pronounced dead later that morning.
Safety issues
The chief engineer was working on live equipment without suitable arrangements in place to guard against electrical shock.
The chief engineer was working in an enclosed space without enclosed space working procedures being in place.
A permit to work (PTW) was not issued for the task and the associated hazards were not identified.
The yacht's safety management system definition of an enclosed space was incorrect and focused solely on toxic atmospheres.
There was a mismatch in the definitions of an enclosed space in the Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers.
The MAIB said that, in view of the actions taken by yacht operating company Nigel Burgess, no recommendations have been made.
Nigel Burgess' actions included the following:
Amended its PTW for electrical work to provide greater emphasis on: the elevated risk of electrical shock on board ships; the necessary precautions to be taken before working on electrical equipment; and the need to avoid working on live electrical systems wherever possible
Updated its safety management manual to provide clearer qualification as to when a PTW is required
Revised its company risk assessments and standard operational procedures (RASOP) template to include the Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers (COSWP) Chapter 15 definition of an enclosed space and to provide greater emphasis on the register of enclosed spaces
Directed that RASOPs across the fleet are reviewed on board to ensure that the vessel’s register of enclosed spaces is correct, and instructed that these RASOPs are to be verified by the designated yacht manager
Promulgated a circular to its fleet to draw attention to the changes to the safety management system specifying procedures for controlling hazards associated with enclosed spaces and the PTW updates
Instructed Burgess internal auditors to commence a concentrated 2025 audit focus to confirm that the register of enclosed spaces reflects the COSWP Chapter 15 definition and that any entrance to an enclosed space is identified, marked, and controlled against unauthorised entry
