COLUMN | Better late than never? UK tug industry responds to fatal capsizing with safety overhaul [Tug Times]
Last November, the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) published its report into the loss of the tug Biter on the Clyde in February 2023.
Biter was a twin-screw conventional tug that girted and capsized whilst assisting the passenger vessel Hebridean Princess. The two crewmembers could not escape, and both tragically lost their lives.
Among the safety issues identified by the MAIB were that the pilot’s training had not prepared him to work with conventional tugs, that the master/pilot and pilot/tug exchanges were incomplete so there was no shared understanding of the plan, that the ship’s speed was too high, and that the tug’s gob rope rendered and did not prevent it from girting.
The MAIB made recommendations to professional organisations representing pilots, harbourmasters and tug owners to develop appropriate guidance for their members on the safety issues raised in the report, which has been described as, "a sobering indictment of systemic vulnerabilities in conventional towage operations".
Now industry associations have responded through Workboat Association Chief Executive Kerrie Forster, who is quoted by Riviera as saying industry has improved safety on tugs and towage operations in the UK as a result of the MAIB findings. He also claimed the loss of two lives, "‘was not just a tragedy – it was a call to action".
Apparently, the collective response has been a blend of reflection, collaboration and unity. In the month’s following the report’s release, the industry watched closely for leadership from its representative bodies while they quietly contacted one another and developed a plan.
Unfortunately, producing best practice guidance is tougher than it looks, because, "there has historically been no unity on the art of conventional towage and it has evolved differently in different areas, without any shared best practice or clear identification of the best safe methods of design or working."
Nonetheless, by March 2025, new technical guidance was released on gob rope and towline testing, while the British Tugowners Association helped develop a standardised communication framework to be included in the new Ports and Marine Facilities Safety Code.
And this is not all, Mr Forster assures us. A document on gob rope good practice will shortly be published, and simulator training software has been developed for conventional tugs.
But there is more to do – there is currently no unified training standard for conventional tug operations, and the industry campaign needs to incorporate methodology for ensuring industry-wide acceptance, with standardised procedures for designing, testing and using gob ropes, and enhanced training and awareness around conventional tug operations.
Mr Forster’s peroration is worth quoting at length:
"The Biter tragedy underscored the lethal consequences of weak coordination and communications at several levels, and although the design of the vessels may be traditional, the practices of how to operate them need to be up to date.
"Industry associations now look to move beyond reactive guidance and towards proactive leadership. This includes championing new training frameworks; advocating for regulatory updates that reflect more diverse towage risks; and ensuring best practice guidance reaches every tug operator, pilot and harbour master, not just those already engaged.
"The associations are not only acting, they are now showing they can lead. And gentlemen in England now a-bed shall think themselves accursed they were not here, and hold their manhood cheap whiles any speaks that fought with us upon Saint Crispin’s day."
Alright, I confess the last sentence is from Shakespeare and was added by me, but it seemed to fit the rest of the peroration perfectly.
Please do not think I am belittling the efforts of the UK industry associations, because they are obviously acting sensibly and well, but I cannot shake off the feeling that more could have been done much earlier.
We have known about the problems of working with conventional tugs for a very long time, and in its report on Biter, the MAIB refers to similar investigations it has conducted in the past. Among the ones they mention are the following:
Trijnie (1999): While assisting a tanker entering a lock, the tug girted, capsized and sank after attempting a turn to starboard. The tug was found to be ill-suited for the task, and had never done it before. The coxswain had no experience of that type of operation, and the pilot was not aware of his inexperience.
Ijsselstroom (2009): While acting as a stern tug on a large barge arriving in the port, the tug used a stern towline with no bridle. The skipper was unable to control the tug’s severe yawing, and the tug took a sheer to starboard, girted and capsized. There was no formal staff training programme, no assessment of skipper’s knowledge and experience, inherently unstable mode of operation, speed too high, no training in winch emergency release.
Asterix (2015): The tug girted and capsized while assisting a small chemical tanker. The coxswain’s training was insufficient and it did not equip him to use the gob rope effectively. There was also poor communication, and the crew could not activate the emergency release mechanism.
Domingue (2016): A containership moved ahead without warning the tug, which girted and capsized. The tug was found to be not very manoeuvrable and the crew were inexperienced in the task. There was also no gob rope or emergency release.
My point is that similar accidents have been investigated over the past quarter of a century involving several fatalities, and the findings have been published, so we should all have been aware of the dangers.
In a similar vein, it is also just over a quarter of a century since Captain Henk Hensen first published Tug Use in Port, which rapidly became the standard text for everyone in the industry. I spent 10 minutes leafing through the second edition, published in 2003, and uncovered the following snippets regarding conventional tugs:
"With higher speeds it is almost impossible to steer the tug safely and is therefore very dangerous (page 46)."
"When angle between a (conventional) tug’s heading and incoming water flow becomes too large the tug might not be able to come back in line with the assisted ship and, as a consequence, athwartship towline forces might overturn the tug if the towline cannot be released in time (pages 52 to 53)."
"At speeds over about three knots, it is dangerous to manoeuvre from the beam to astern of a ship...A tug may come broadside on ....and may capsize unless the towline is released in time (page 54)."
"Only at very low speeds is steering control to both sides and control of ship’s speed possible (page 57)."
There is much more, of course, and I am aware I have not placed the above extracts in context, but the overall message is clear (and has been for decades).
This is why I have mixed feelings about the new initiatives. They are praiseworthy and the industry organisations should be congratulated, but I found the self-congratulation distasteful. A humble apology for not acting sooner would have been more appropriate, in my view.
And as for leadership, it seems rather late to make that boast.
