Canadian transport investigators publish report on loss of fishing vessel off Newfoundland
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) has published its investigation report on the loss of the crab and gillnet fishing vessel Elite Navigator off Newfoundland and Labrador on July 17, 2024.
Nine days prior to the incident, Elite Navigator, with the master and six crewmembers on board, departed Valleyfield, Newfoundland and Labrador, to fish turbot.
By July 17, the vessel had caught its quota. At approximately 18:30 local time on that date, the master used a satellite messenger to notify the owner that they were on the way to port to land their catch and that their estimated arrival time was 14:30 on July 18.
At this time, the vessel was about 137 nautical miles east-northeast of Fogo Island.
At approximately 19:30, an alarm sounded in the wheelhouse. The master checked the alarm panel and determined that it was from a smoke detector in the engine room.
The master looked at the video camera that monitored the engine room, but there was no smoke visible. The master then went to one of the engine room access hatches in the deckhouse and proceeded partway down a ladder into the engine room to check for smoke. Light smoke was now visible.
Shortly after, a crewmember in the deckhouse yelled that there was a fire in the exhaust trunking. Another crewmember grabbed a dry powder extinguisher and tried to extinguish the fire through the interior doorway to the exhaust trunking.
Meanwhile, the master returned to the wheelhouse and shut down the main engine. The master and one of the crewmembers then went outside on the main deck and pried the exhaust trunking vent off the back of the deckhouse to get access to the other side of the exhaust trunking. From here, they continued to try to fight the fire with another extinguisher.
The attempts to fight the fire with the extinguishers were not successful, and all seven crewmembers were forced to abandon ship. However, the survivors went adrift in a liferaft for more than 50 hours until they were finally rescued by a Canadian Coast Guard vessel at 23:28 on July 19.
Cause of fire not determined
The seven crewmembers suffered only minor injuries while the vessel eventually sank and was not recovered. The TSB said that since the vessel was not recovered, it was not possible to determine the exact cause of the fire.
The fire was first identified in the exhaust trunking, which contained piping for the main engine and generator exhaust. The exhaust trunking measured approximately 120 cm by 60 cm and was located on the vessel’s centreline, just forward of the aft bulkhead in the deckhouse. It was constructed of wood, and the interior bulkheads were covered by painted plywood, which is not fire resistant.
Design of CO2 fixed fire suppression systems on fishing vessels
Elite Navigator’s engine room was fitted with a CO2 fixed fire suppression system. CO2 is non-flammable and non-conductive and is often used for fire suppression in engine rooms. When applied to a fire, CO2 provides a heavy blanket of gas that displaces oxygen to a point where combustion cannot occur.
Any openings to the engine room space must be sealed before the CO2 is released. The TSB said that, because fires can grow rapidly, it is important these openings be sealed quickly.
In this occurrence, the CO2 system was not used because the fire was in the exhaust trunking and it was not clear to the crew whether the system would be able to extinguish a fire in that location.
In the course of collecting data about the CO2 system on Elite Navigator, the investigation identified that the vents on the deckhouse top were not fitted with covers or shutters. This meant that there was no way to quickly seal the engine room for the release of CO2.
The vessel did have removeable shutters that could be installed to close the vents; however, locating and installing these shutters could take time that may not be available in an emergency.
The CO2 system on Elite Navigator had been fitted on the vessel voluntarily, as it was not required by regulation. There are many other fishing vessels under 24 metres like Elite Navigator that are similarly equipped with voluntarily fitted systems.
Because Transport Canada (TC) does not require these systems on small fishing vessels, there are no specific regulations covering them. While the Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations do broadly require machinery and equipment to be maintained in a safe operating condition, the regulations do not provide any specifics about CO2 systems.
When TC inspectors board fishing vessels to do inspections, they therefore have no procedure with which to verify CO2 systems for compliance. TC inspectors may visually verify the overall condition of the systems during inspections and, if requested by the authorised representative, check the maintenance records for the system.
Distress notification
When a vessel’s crew needs to abandon ship, their survival often depends on transmitting a distress signal that reaches search and rescue resources. Elite Navigator carried a number of distress alerting devices, each of which had different capabilities.
In this occurrence, in the limited amount of time available before the crew abandoned ship, distress calls were made using the vessel’s VHF radiotelephone and VHF-DSC. VHF-DSC is required on many vessels and is a well-known distress alerting device.
Training for the Radio Operator Certificate – Maritime Commercial, which the master had taken, is focused on VHF communications, and the master naturally went to the VHF radiotelephone to make distress calls. However, because the vessel was approximately 130 nautical miles from shore, beyond the range of VHF and VHF-DSC, it was not possible for these calls to reach MCTS stations directly.
There was a chance that the voice calls might have reached other vessels, but there was no indication that they did. MF radiotelephones have a greater maximum range than VHF and VHF-DSC devices, at approximately 100 to 150 nautical miles, which increases the potential that the distress call will be received by other vessels or by MCTS stations.
Elite Navigator also had an emergency position-indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) located on top of the deckhouse. The EPIRB could be activated manually or automatically by submersion in water.
The EPIRB did not send a signal, likely because it was damaged by the fire, and it was not manually activated because the crew were focused on other emergency duties.
TSB Watchlist
The TSB Watchlist identifies the key safety issues that need to be addressed to make Canada’s transportation system even safer. Commercial fishing safety has been on the watchlist since 2010. The issue of commercial fishing safety will remain on the watchlist until there are sufficient indications that a sound safety culture has taken root throughout the industry and in fishing communities across the country.
TSB investigations often find evidence of weak safety cultures on commercial fishing vessels; however, in the case of Elite Navigator, the vessel carried more safety equipment than was required by regulation, and the master and crewmembers were in the practice of talking through emergency scenarios and responses. They also demonstrated concepts from safety training during the occurrence, in particular their use of lifesaving equipment.
Safety messages
If fishing vessels are fitted with CO2 systems, it is important that these systems be designed optimally for emergencies. For example, the ventilation to the engine room must be able to be sealed quickly.
The survival of the crew in an abandonment situation often depends on successfully transmitting a distress signal to search and rescue resources. For this reason, it is important that mariners be familiar with the capabilities of different distress alerting devices so they can use the most appropriate device for the scenario.
Having emergency equipment available, and ensuring that the crew are familiar with its use, contributes to survival in an emergency.
