The Pacific Patrol Boat (PPB) programme has been a highly successful contribution to maritime security in the South Pacific over the past 25 years or so. It's assisted the Pacific island countries (PICs) to develop their capacity to protect their maritime resources, which are in most cases the major component of sustainable economic development for those countries.
The PPBs have also been used for a range of other important tasks beyond fisheries law enforcement, including search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and medical evacuations from outer islands.
The programme has also served Australia's regional interests well: it's been a tangible demonstration of our interest in the South Pacific and a prominent contribution to the region's ability to deal with maritime security issues. These matters are a common concern of both Australia and the PICs.
The 22 PPBs gifted to the island nations will start reaching the end of their service lives from 2018, but Australia's future plans for South Pacific maritime security assistance remain opaque. We need to develop a coherent plan for our long-term contribution to South Pacific maritime surveillance and enforcement.
While there has been criticism that many PPBs fail to achieve the requisite number of sea days, that does not detract from the overall success of the programme. It's been the cornerstone of Australia's strategic influence in the region. As we plan for what might follow the PPB programme, we need to think strategically and not become bogged down in operational considerations.
The Australian Defence organisation is best placed to ensure that there's the necessary strategic perspective in our future contribution to Pacific maritime security.
It needs to take the lead in planning that contribution. This includes working with the US, New Zealand, France, Japan and China to address Pacific maritime security concerns through the creation of a regional maritime coordination centre, which will collect, fuse and analyse data and coordinate responses from regional and national assets.
Maritime aid
Between 1987 and 1995, Australia supplied 22 PPBs to twelve island countries: Papua New Guinea (four boats), Vanuatu (one), Cook Islands (one), Kiribati (one), Palau (one), Tonga (three), Fiji (three), Solomon Islands (two), Federated States of Micronesia (three), Republic of the Marshall Islands (one), Samoa (one) and Tuvalu (one).
They're owned, operated and maintained by the PICs. Technical and operational support is provided by 25 in-country Royal Australian Navy (RAN) maritime surveillance advisers (MSAs) and technical advisers. The PPB programme has been mainly, although not solely, focused on fisheries enforcement activities, but in most recipient states the boats and the MSAs have been assigned to the police, rather than fisheries agencies. In only three countries (Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga) are they operated by the defence force. Over recent years, increased operating costs and budgetary constraints have resulted in the patrol boats falling well short of their potential capacity.
Defence provides funding for infrastructure and logistics, training and skills support, and general assistance to support the PPB capability. A five-year contract valued at AU$49.5 million (US$53.2 million) for ongoing support and third refit costs for the PPBs was awarded in October 2010.
The need for action
While there have been numerous studies about what might come after the PPB programme, along with recommendations by a parliamentary committee and undertakings of action to regional forums, little progress has been made.
Our reputation in the region will suffer if action isn't taken to redress the situation. For better or worse, there are expectations among the PICs and the other stakeholders in Pacific maritime security that there will be a follow‐on of some sort to the PPB programme.
Maritime security in the South Pacific is a vital issue for Australia. Determining what material assistance we might offer after the PPB Program is a significant task. It requires an appreciation of the full implications of the programme, and of the importance of extensive liaison with all relevant stakeholders. It requires in-depth understanding of the region, of the policies and interests of the 20 or so sovereign stakeholders, and of the relevant legal frameworks, as well as of the strengths, weaknesses and costs of possible air and surface capabilities. It requires a much greater commitment of resources and effort than is currently being allocated to it.
Urgent action is required by Australia to catch up on lost ground in developing a plan for the material assistance Australia will contribute to regional maritime security following the PPB programme. Our procrastination has contributed in no small way to our loss of strategic influence in the South Pacific in recent years.
It's no good waiting for ideas to come out of the Pacific. Australia has the necessary knowledge and expertise, the issue has already been sufficiently studied for a plan to be developed, and the PICs now expect Australia to take the lead.
An interagency taskforce led by the Department of Defence should be established to develop costed proposals for the provision of Australia's future contribution to maritime security in the South Pacific. The proposals should recognise the capability options discussed in this paper and the recommendations of the Senate FADT Committee.
Representatives of the taskforce should consult as necessary with other possible contributors of material assistance to the maritime security needs of the PICs, including France, Japan, New Zealand, the US and China.
This isn't just about replacing boats: it's also about developing the supporting legislative, governance and management architecture that's going to be needed.
Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin, reprinted from ASPI Strategic Insights (read the full report here)
It is hoped that planning for the next round of PPBs will include detailed research into the real needs and desires of the recipient PICs. While they realise that "beggars can't be choosers", those we have spoken with feel that closer consultation would be beneficial. Most would prefer a more general-purpose vessel than a mini-warship.
It has been suggested that an adaptation of current crew/supply boats would be both sensible and economical. Lightly armed with a gun on the bow and a large, open aft deck, they would be both versatile and practical. -Ed
