The rapid, and unprecedented, growth of Chinese naval power and influence in Asia has, so far, gone virtually unchecked. Now, though, there are signs that a de facto "alliance" of resistant nations is emerging, united in their concern that Beijing may be moving towards achieving a stranglehold on the continent's sea trade routes, and offshore resources.
America has recently adopted a tough line against the use of force to back up regional maritime claims. Japan is showing China that it means business over the disputed Dioayu (Senkaku) islands. Hanoi, for its part, continues to build up its presence in the South China Sea, to the accompaniment of an intensive propaganda campaign, promoting Vietnam's claims to the Spratly Islands, which sovereignty over is also claimed by China, and four other nations.
The Vietnamese, seeking to encourage an international naval presence in and around its territorial waters, now frequently welcomes official visits to their nation by foreign warships. Hanoi has also established formal defence co-operation agreements with a range of foreign powers, including Australia, Brazil, France, and the United Kingdom. These agreements are mainly focused, for the time being at least, on training, and humanitarian aspects of naval operations.
India's navy, meanwhile, is assiduously building operational ties with Southeast Asia's maritime forces, as well as entering into a formal military support and training agreement with Vietnam, and enhancing military links with Burma, a strategically important country, which is a long-time ally of China.
Although traditionally wary of Chinese ambitions, Russia has continued to reap advantage from the situation by selling large quantities of military equipment to both India and China, as well as to Vietnam. Now, however, it appears that Moscow, which has for many years enjoyed cordial relations with Hanoi, has decided to greatly enhance its support of the Vietnamese. This move is a strong indication that it values Vietnam, one of Asia's most militarily efficient powers, as a long term buffer against China.
In Hanoi in late October, Vietnamese President Nguyen Minh Triet, and his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, signed a US$ 2.1 billion agreement to expand collaboration in a number of business areas, including defence technology. The agreement, which was the culmination of an official visit to Vietnam by Medvedev, included plans to jointly develop, for both Vietnamese and foreign use, the naval and civilian, ports at Cam Ranh Bay, a project which is expected to take about three years to complete.
The plans for Cam Ranh Bay will help to internationalise the increasingly sensitive strategic issue of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The project will also complement Moscow's well-established radical upgrade programme for the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Navy (SRVN), which is intended to act as a brake on Chinese dominance of the sea. Russia has already supplied the SRVN with Tarantul and Molniya missile corvettes, as well as Svetlyak offshore patrol vessels, and advanced Bastion shore-based ant-shipping missiles. Gepard frigates, additional Svetlyaks, and Kilo diesel electric submarines are on order from Russia.
The Russians themselves can be expected to reap much advantage from access to an upgraded Cam Ranh Bay. The base is well positioned to help sustain the Russian fleet's politically important anti-piracy deployments to the seaways off Somalia. Usually consisting of task groups made up of Udaloy destroyers and support ships, this commitment is currently supported from the relatively distant Russian Far East port of Vladivostok. Furthermore, the base will not only offer ready access to the South China Sea, but will also help to sustain a credible regional presence by the resurgent Russian Navy in other important theatres, such as the Straits of Malacca, the Singapore Straits, the Northern Indian Ocean and the East China Sea.
Cam Ranh Bay, situated some 354 kilometres northeast of Ho Chi Minh City, offers extensive sea frontage, a water depth of about 14 metres, a defensible hinterland, and adjacent aviation support facilities. It has previously been used by foreign navies, including Russia's.
The bay was used as a home port for ships of France's Indochina fleet from the latter part of the nineteenth century, with the French modernising the base in the 1930s. The Imperial Japanese Navy then made use of it from 1942 until Tokyo's surrender. During the Vietnam War, Washington undertook massive development of Cam Ranh Bay, turning it into a hub for operations by a range of US Navy vessels deployed on air support, shore bombardment, amphibious, blockade and special forces missions in support of the land campaign. American fighters, bombers, and long range maritime patrol (LRMP) aircraft, furthermore, operated from the bay's air base.
Following the American withdrawal from Vietnam, and the subsequent defeat, in 1975 of the Republic of South Vietnam by the forces of communist North Vietnam, Soviet Russia was quick to establish military connections with the new regime in Hanoi.
The Soviet Navy established a big base at Cam Ranh Bay in 1979, and used the facility both to help protect Hanoi's offshore interests, and to extend Russia's regional naval reach. The base supported operations by Soviet frigates, destroyers, nuclear submarines, and amphibious warfare vessels, as well as by aviation assets in the form of fighters, strategic bombers and LRMP aircraft.
Moscow also established an electronic signal intelligence (SIGINT) station near the base. Russian naval operations from Can Ranh Bay, incidentally, actually date back to the early twentieth century, when warships of the Imperial Russian Navy briefly used the French base during the Russo-Japanese War.
The Soviets later progressively withdrew from Cam Ranh, as the Cold War petered out, and the Vietnamese started demanding high rental payments. The last Russian manned facility, namely the SIGINT station, shut down in 2002.
According to Vietnamese Defence Minister General Phung Quang Thanh, Cam Ranh Bay will in future offer shelter, and repair facilities, to warships, and merchant vessels, of many foreign nations, while the SRVN will conduct operations from a dedicated section of the base.
