The mammoth 'Deepwater Horizon' oil spill in the US Gulf of Mexico is the latest issue to focus attention on concerns about tanker shipping safety in the Bosporus. About 75 million tonnes per annum of crude oil, or about 15 tanker-loads per day, are currently shipped southbound through the Bosporus and the Turkish authorities are worried about the congested waterway's ability to cope with the continued growth in the volume of oil traffic.
{rokbox title=|Source :: Bosporus Strait|}images/stories/ShipsShipping/2010-05/bosporus_strait.jpg{/rokbox}
The Turkish environment ministry met with 20 leading oil companies in Istanbul last month and, after expressing its unease about the oil pollution threat in the wake of 'Deepwater Horizon', unveiled its proposals for limits on the size of tankers transiting the Bosporus, higher insurance fees and improved safety standards. It is intended that these measures would bridge the gap until planned alternative oil pipeline transportation routes are ready in three or four years. There were no objections to the ministry's proposals from the oil company participants at the meeting.
The 1936 Montreux Convention governs the passage of ships through the Bosporus and it allows free transit to all commercial vessels of all nations. The treaty was agreed long before the era of oil tankers and the appearance over the years of ever larger vessels carrying quantities of oil from Russian, Ukrainian and Georgian loading ports through the Mediterranean/Black Sea choke point has necessitated the imposition of certain restrictions on tanker traffic.
The switch of oil from tankers transiting the Bosporus to trans-Turkey pipeline routes would benefit the country in several ways. Not only would the risk of an oil spill in the straits which separate the Asian and European parts of Turkey be reduced but also government coffers would be swelled by the transit fees paid by the pipeline operators on the volume of oil handled. Under the terms of the Montreux Convention Turkey is not permitted to charge vessels a fee for their passage through the Bosporus although many Turkish companies depend for their livelihood on the services they provide to transit traffic.
The most notable of the proposed oil pipeline projects is the Samsun-Ceyhan scheme. Russia has signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkey covering its participation in the new link and the intention is to build a 1.6-metre diameter, 550-kilometre crude oil pipeline with a capacity of 60 million tonnes per annum from the Turkish ports of Samsun on the Black Sea to Ceyhan on the Mediterranean. Oil to be shipped through the line would be loaded on shuttle tankers in the Russian port of Novorossiysk and shipped across the Black Sea to Samsun.
The US$2.5 billion Samsun-Ceyhan line would have the potential to accommodate a large part of the crude oil traffic currently shipped through the Bosporus, limiting tanker shipments to primarily those of clean petroleum products, chemicals and LPG. An alternative approach would be to limit the volume of crude oil that each oil company or trader is able to ship through the Bosporus on tankers and to direct the rest of the oil through the Samsun-Ceyhan line.
Tanker shipping in general would not be adversely affected to any great extent by the new pipeline. There would still be a need for a fleet of Black Sea shuttle vessels as well as tankers to load export cargoes at the Ceyhan pipeline terminus.
However, irrespective of the attractions of alternative pipeline routes to the busy tanker traffic for exports of Russian and Caspian Sea oil, oil transportation in the region is mired in energy politics. As is the case with a range of gas export pipeline projects proposed for the Caucasus, the planned oil pipelines and their potential routes are the subject of sensitive diplomatic manoeuvring amongst producer and candidate transit countries.
Most Central Asian oil producers, who are also FSU states, would like to utilise export routes which bypass Russia in order to reinforce their status as independent states. This drive has spurred the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) link, currently the only trans-Turkey oil pipeline. This overland pipeline has provided Azerbaijan with an important alternative route for exporting its oil output to world markets.
Commissioned in 2006, the US$3.2 billion, 1,760-kilometre TBC line has a capacity of 50 million tonnes per annum and throughput is currently running at 36 million tonnes per annum. Upon completion it required six months and 10 million barrels of crude oil to fill the entire length of the pipeline. If it were not for the availability of the overland Turkey part of the BTC pipeline, oil shipments through the Bosporus would be almost one-half as large again as the current volume.
Another trans-Turkey Central Asia pipeline project put forward in recent years is that from Kazakhstan. The scheme would have involved the construction of a new refinery at Ceyhan and part of the petroleum product output would have been utilised to supply Turkey's growing domestic needs. However, Kazakhstan has recently pulled the plug on the idea, citing the high pipeline and refinery construction costs and the current economic climate.
One mooted Bosporus bypass pipeline initiative that does not involve Turkey is the Bourgas-Alexandropoulis link. This project, which has been on the drawing board for many years, calls for the construction of a 285-kilometre pipeline from the Bulgarian town of Bourgas on the Black Sea to Alexandroupolis on northeastern Greece's Aegean coast. It would have a capacity of 35 million tonnes per annum and be used as part of an export route involving Russian and Kazakhstan crude oil loaded at Novorossiysk.
Russia, Bulgaria and Greece signalled a renewed commitment to the Bourgas-Alexandropoulis concept in 2007 when they signed a trilateral agreement resurrecting the scheme. More recently, however, the Bulgarian government has indicated that it has no enthusiasm for such a pipeline across its territory and mentioned the pollution threat, as highlighted by the 'Deepwater Horizon' spill, as a determining factor.
Elsewhere, Russia is hinting that even the planned Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline project may be in jeopardy. Although the presidents of both Russia and Turkey were extolling the merits of the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline and highlighting their support for the project only six months ago, the latest statements from the Russian energy ministry warn that the Pacific export market may represent a better long-term bet for the country's oil and that resources might be better directed to the long-distance east-west oil pipelines Russia is now building.
Whether directing more Russian oil in an easterly direction will leave enough volume to justify the construction of the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline is a moot point. However, it is not likely that both the Samsun-Ceyhan and the Bourgas-Alexandropoulis pipelines can be economically justified.
Russia is now stating that the Samsun-Ceyhan line, if it does materialise, will not be in service until at least 2015. That leaves another five years of rather busy tanker traffic in the Bosporus along with the likelihood of further restrictions governing the movement of such vessels.
Another interesting outcome of the current Bosporus shipping versus oil pipeline debate is that 'Deepwater Horizon' and the threat of oil pollution are being used as both an excuse for not building new pipelines and a reason why tanker shipments through the straits need to be reduced.
Mike Corkhill
Editor's Note: Mike Corkhill is a technical journalist and consultant specialising in oil, gas and chemical transport, including tanker shipping and chemical logistics. A qualified naval architect, he has written books on LNG, LPG, chemical and product tankers and is currently the editor of both LNG World Shipping and LPG World Shipping.
Source: bimco.org
