

In support of its claims to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (SCS), Beijing has over the past two years been carrying out large scale construction work on at least seven of the islands.
Washington takes no position on competing claims for sovereignty over the islands, but strongly advocates the right of ships of all nations to conduct innocent passage in the SCS. On 27th October there was a highly significant development, when the US Navy Arleigh Burke Flight IIa class destroyer 'Lassen',carried out a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the SCS, co-ordinated with aerial surveillance by P3C Orion and P8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft.
The FONOP required 'Lassen' to sail within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, an outcrop which has been subject to extensive construction work, reportedly including preparation for the building of an airstrip..
The US destroyer thereby deliberately penetrated a sea area which China is likely to claim as its territorial waters. Any such claim, though, would be based upon Chinese artificial bolstering of features which were previously only exposed at low tide, and could therefore readily be challenged under Article 60 of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Legal opinion on whether or not the 'Lassen' mission was truly an "innocent passage", though, seems to be divided.
Washington appears to have been careful to demonstrate impartiality, as 'Lassen' also passed within the claimed maritime territorial limits of other Spratly claimant nations.
During the course of the operation 'Lassen' was shadowed by the PLA Navy destroyer 'Lanzhou', and a China Coast Guard patrol ship.
Follow-up to the 'Lassen' mission was swift. Beijing protested volubly, and reported that a PLA Navy task group had, in response, carried out exercises in the waters around the Spratlys. Also, according to some reports, a Chinese submarine was detected tailing the US nuclear powered aircraft carrier 'Ronald Reagan', and PLA Navy J-15 fighter bombers overflew Subi Reef.
There were also well-publicised teleconference discussions between US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson, and PLA navy commander Admiral Wu Shengli.
Then, in early November the US Navy landing platform (helicopter) 'Essex,' a major power projection asset carrying marines, V-22 Tiltrotor troop transports and Harrier fighter bombers, and accompanied by the amphibious warfare vessels 'Anchorage' and 'Rushmore', escorting destroyers, carried out exercises in the SCS.
It is also worthy of note that, on 3rd November the frigates 'Arunta', and 'Stuart', and replenishment tanker 'Sirius' of the Royal Australian Navy, and the French frigate 'Vendemiaire' carried out joint manoeuvres in the SCS.
As expected, though, China's regional rivals for Spratlys sovereignty maintained a low profile, with November's meeting of ASEAN defence ministers failing to make any mention of SCS security matters in its closing communiqué.
The US Navy has two littoral combat ships, optimised for coastal and middle water operations stationed in Singapore. It is therefore surprising that the 10,000-tonne, heavily armed deep-sea combatant 'Lassen' was deployed for the FONOP.
It could have been intended as a reminder to Beijing that the firepower of the US Navy's 7th Fleet is vastly superior to that of the PLA Navy's Southern Fleet. Alternatively, the decision might have been influenced by the fact that Singapore was about to host ground-breaking talks between the Presidents of the People's Republic of China, and Taiwan.
So, what might the future hold in the SCS? Further US Navy FONOP missions are a certainty, and Washington may encourage other nations to exercise freedom of navigation by their warships in the SCS. It is possible that Vietnam, by far the most determined rival of China in the sea, and a rapidly emerging naval power, may now see an opportunity to intensify its activities in and around the Spratlys.
Tensions therefore seem certain to rise from time to time. Beijing though, values defence diplomacy contacts between the US and PLA Navies highly (there is no sign that visits by US warships to China are to be curtailed), and will probably feel obliged to act with greater caution, and to tone down its rhetoric on the Spratlys.
Trevor Hollingsbee