OPINION | Russia, China test limits with hybrid confrontations ahead of Trump term
On Christmas Day, authorities in Estonia and Finland noted the sudden interruption of the Estlink 2 undersea electricity cable linking their two nations - just as ship tracking data showed the Cook Islands-registered Eagle S passing outbound from Russia’s Baltic coast en route to Egypt.
In November, Chinese tanker Yi Peng 3 had spent more than a month anchored in the Kattegat Strait between Denmark and Sweden after being suspected of using its anchor table to cut two further fibre-optic cables, one linking Germany and Finland and the other Sweden and Lithuania.
According to Swedish prosecutors, Chinese authorities demanded the right to conduct their own investigation on board, which Swedish officials were briefly permitted to observe. But the ship eventually sailed without any official clarity on whether it was behind the damage.
When it came to the Eagle S, however, authorities in Finland were determined to move quickly.
By the morning of Boxing Day, Finnish Coast Guard officials had boarded the vessel – whose registration showed it was owned by a company in the United Arab Emirates.
Authorities in Finland have since said they believe the ship was part of Russia’s “shadow fleet”, which are often poorly maintained vessels used to evade sanctions, and, on occasion, conduct other deniable operations on behalf of the Kremlin.
The Finnish interception and seizure of the vessel were among the most aggressive steps taken so far by a major Western state in the face of what officials say has been an escalating campaign of sabotage, subversion and other “hybrid warfare” activity by both Russia and China.
On the other side of the world, Taiwan’s coastguard said another vessel - registered in both Tanzania and Cameroon, but with a Chinese crew - was suspected of being behind the breakage of another undersea cable, the second such incident in waters around the island in the last three years.
As with events in Europe, such incidents appear deliberately designed to intimidate – although both Moscow and Beijing almost always deny involvement.
As Donald Trump prepares to re-enter the White House on January 20, America’s allies in both Europe and the Pacific are increasingly nervous that a more transactional US administration may leave them more vulnerable to Russian and Chinese aggression, possibly even conventional military attack.
Many of America’s allies in Europe and Asia have already reached out to the nascent Trump administration.
Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung told Japanese news outlet Nikkei that Taiwan accepted criticism from Trump and those around him that it must do more in its own defence, and said it wished to work with Washington to secure a “democratic supply chain”.
Multiple European allies have also pledged to raise spending on their own defences.
But Trump’s hint that he might use military force to seize Greenland from Denmark has already prompted criticism from the European Union, France and Germany.
He has said little on his approach to US allies in Asia, beyond pledging to impose tariffs on China, but in the past has appeared to question whether the US should act to defend Taiwan if Beijing invades.
The incoming president has pledged to deliver “peace through strength”, including a stronger US military – but given little clarity about what that means in practice.
Early signs suggest he hopes to show the power and diplomatic ability of his new administration by delivering “deals” to end or manage conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, while pressuring European NATO members to crank up arms spending fast.
In that environment, Russia and China might choose not to risk an all-out war by attacking Taiwan or an Eastern NATO member – but instead feel incentivised to step up “sub threshold”, “hybrid warfare” or “grey zone” pressure looking to intimidate what they regard as weaker or more vulnerable US partners, without crossing into open conflict.
Tearing up the rulebook
Such an approach is not devoid of risk.
As he prepares to enter office, Trump is clearly looking for examples to assert his power and US dominance, one reason he has raised the prospect of taking back the Panama Canal or even using economic levers to make Canada a US state.
No US president has advocated territorial expansion along those lines since the First World War over a century ago, and there are concerns such a move might further encourage Russian and Chinese enlargement efforts.
At the very least, it would further tear up the rulebook Western nations have encouraged the world to follow since 1945, potentially opening the door to yet more “hybrid” or “grey zone” actions.
In his pre-inauguration press conference on Wednesday, Trump made it clear he expects European nations to spend more in their own defence – he said as much as five percent of GDP, more than twice the current level of most countries.
And he threatened that “all hell” would break loose if Palestinian Islamist group Hamas did not release the remaining Israeli and US hostages it took in October 2023.
Whether or not Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping are more or less likely to attack established US allies than they were under the Biden administration is hotly debated.
Trump and those around him have argued that his sheer unpredictability makes it less likely that potential US foes will take the risk of confrontation.
In his own words, Trump said Xi - and by implication others - "know I’m ****ing crazy” and would be worried they might face an overwhelming US-led response.
Certainly, in Biden’s last year in office there was a considerable uptick in both Russian-linked sabotage and other deniable but unquestionably aggressive acts in Europe as well as Chinese military posturing towards Taiwan and other regional US allies including Japan and the Philippines.
Both appeared to continue over December and the Christmas period, if anything intensifying.
In its last two years in office, the Biden administration frequently referred to deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as its number one strategic priority.
In its final weeks in office, the administration also signed off a major arms package deal for Ukraine to help keep it in the fight before any negotiations start once Trump is president.
The early weeks and months of the ensuing Trump administration are likely to be closely watched for signs of shifts to those dynamics. The Pentagon has already scheduled major drills in both Europe and the Pacific for the first half of the year, and these are unlikely to be altered.
Allies and potential enemies alike will be watching for any purges of senior leaders at the Pentagon as Trump and his pick as defense secretary Peter Hegseth have suggested removing some officials who have spent years building links and trust with European and Pacific partners.
Most expect further confrontation and escalation – one reason Finland moved fast after the Christmas table incident.
Estonia has also stepped up patrols in the mid-Baltic, while the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force will set up a special capability using artificial intelligence to track Russia’s “shadow fleet” and other suspect vessels when they approach key cables or other strategic points.
US officials have repeatedly warned that China's Xi has ordered his military to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, though they say there is no evidence he has yet made a decision to do so.
In his New Year message this year, Xi cast “reunification” with the mainland as “inevitable” for the second year running, warning that no one would be able to stop it.
Should that happen, US and other officials increasingly believe it might be accompanied by a Russian attack in Europe as the two countries work more closely together.
Beijing is already bracing for Trump’s threatened increased tariffs as well as perhaps a broader confrontation.
According to Japanese news outlet Nikkei, Chinese firms and government-linked entities have stepped up stockpiling of US and Taiwanese-manufactured microchips.
Despite that, officials in Taiwan in particular suspect Beijing is far from ready, pointing to the ongoing removal of multiple senior Chinese officials for corruption.
Still, there seems little doubt China will continue ratcheting up the pressure – including the undersea cable incidents, military incursions and cyber attacks – as well as political destabilisation when it can.
In the second week of last month, Taiwanese officials reported more than 90 Chinese vessels conducting what appeared to be exercises around the island. While prior major Chinese drills were heavily flagged on Chinese state and military social media, this one appeared to go unmentioned.
According to data from monitoring social media feed "PLA Tracker", China's warplanes flew into Taiwanese-controlled airspace more than 3,000 times in 2024, by far the most on record.
Japan says China’s coastguard also set a new record for the number of days in which it had infringed on waters claimed by Tokyo as part of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
Philippine officials say China’s largest coastguard vessel has also again intruded into waters recognised by the UN international maritime court as part of the Philippines Exclusive Economic zone.
But while any of those confrontations could in theory spark a war, Taiwan is seen as the greatest flashpoint.
Beijing is now reported to have granted Chinese nationality to hundreds or potentially thousands or more of Taiwanese citizens who have requested it.
The Taipei government fears this move could ultimately be used to help justify a military operation against the island – as well as give Beijing a ready population on Taiwan who now hold explicit loyalty to the mainland.
Such a strategy could echo long-running Russian efforts in Europe, including in Ukraine, where the Kremlin has used Russian-speaking populations to both destabilise Western-leaning countries along its border and justify potential military action.
Some in eastern and northern Europe worry that the risk of Russian military action against them may increase sharply if fighting ceases in Ukraine, allowing Putin to rebuild his military machine.
Trump is not yet in the White House. Once he gets there, these tests of strength may step up further – or drop away entirely if America’s potential foes believe they are not worth the risk.
(By Peter Apps; editing by Mark Heinrich)
