Paranoia about fuel supplies has suddenly entered Australia’s mainstream debate, as Canberra wakes up and starts counting how many frigates and destroyers the Royal Australian Navy actually has.
It is a familiar pattern. Australia rediscovers its maritime dependence only when events force the issue.
We are a trading island nation whose prosperity and security rely on ships arriving safely from distant ports. Fuel, fertiliser, ammunition and other essential supplies move through increasingly contested sea lanes that Australia does not control.
The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz should be understood not as a distant Middle East problem, but as a warning. In a serious conflict, Australia’s vulnerability will be defined less by threats to the continent than by our ability to protect the maritime lifelines on which the nation depends.
While crises often prompt a sudden focus on fleet numbers, Australia’s structural challenges in protecting its maritime domain and critical seaborne supply run much deeper.
The problem is not only that the surface fleet is at its smallest and oldest in ship numbers since the 1950s, or that mine warfare and hydrographic capabilities have declined sharply. It begins with a system that has not fully grasped the scale of Australia’s maritime dependence or worked through how to reduce the vulnerability that comes with it.
Addressing these vulnerabilities is not primarily a Department of Defence task. It begins with understanding which goods are truly critical to keep the economy functioning and sustain a war effort, and what key partners rely on from Australia.
Resilience also means reducing what must transit vulnerable sea lanes through industrial policy and stockpiling. Meeting the International Energy Agency requirement to hold 90 days of fuel reserves is only a starting point.
This requires coordination at the national level, not just within Defence. Japan has a minister for ocean policy and a cabinet-level headquarters led by the prime minister. Australia has no comparable mechanism.
Maritime strategy should be driven from the centre of government. Australia’s central security problem does not begin at the coastline; it begins thousands of kilometres beyond it.
The next step is to better protect Australia’s ports and coastline, and to stop using the navy as our default maritime police force. A serious coast guard would help do both.
The Defence Strategic Review argued that Defence should not be the default responder to domestic crises, yet at sea, the navy still carries much of the burden for border protection and enforcement.
In a serious crisis, disruption to shipping, illegal activity and risks to critical infrastructure will increase, not diminish. A properly structured coast guard should carry this burden so the navy can focus on protecting trade and operating forward.
Establishing a coast guard would also allow fragmented maritime responsibilities, including search and rescue now led by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, to be better coordinated.
Once these basics are addressed, attention turns to the navy. Australia needs more frigates and destroyers, and more capable submarines. The Hunter frigate program, the planned acquisition of Mogami-class frigates and AUKUS all point in the right direction. But they are not moving fast enough. Both surface combatant programs should be accelerated, even if this places strain on workforce and supply chains.
Accepting risk now is unavoidable. Six years ago, Defence flagged that strategic warning time could no longer be assumed. Now, the fleet is smaller. We should not expect many more reminders.
Capability gaps that directly affect the protection of trade must be addressed urgently. Naval logistics, mine warfare and hydrography all require urgent investment. The latter two are areas where Australia can build sovereign capacity relatively quickly, but only if government is prepared to prioritise them.
Without access to a strategic fleet of nationally directed shipping, Australia risks having trade routes it cannot use even if sea lanes remain open. A recent taskforce examined the issue, but its recommendations reflected compromise rather than the scale of the strategic problem. Momentum has since faded.
The current conflict in the Middle East has sharpened concerns about Australia’s fuel supplies. Increasing stockpiles is necessary, but it deals only with the symptom, not the problem. Australia still lacks a coherent maritime strategy and the national structures needed to implement one. That is the issue we must now confront.
The steps are clear. As outlined, they begin with recognising our maritime dependence, building resilience at home and organising government to protect the sea lanes on which our security and prosperity depend.
The question is not what needs to be done; it is whether we will act before the next crisis forces us to relearn the lesson.
Article reprinted with permission from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's analysis and commentary site The Strategist.
