From front, the Philippine Coast Guard patrol vessel BRP Teresa Magbanua, the Royal Australian Navy frigate HMAS Toowoomba, the US Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey, and the Philippine Navy guided-missile frigate BRP Diego Silang sail in formation during the Maritime Cooperative Activity in the Philippines' exclusive economic zone, February 16, 2026. US Navy/Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Oscar Diaz
Security

OPINION | A recognition that Australia needs the Philippines in its China strategy

Jennifer Parker

Australia’s relationship with the Philippines is critical to Australia’s defence. The Defence Co-operation Arrangement, signed in Manila on November 15, recognises a crucial fact: defending Australia, and particularly its dependence on maritime trade, requires a network of regional partnerships. It also requires the willingness and ability to push back against China’s aggression in the South China Sea.

The Defence Co-operation Arrangement replaces and expands the 1995 memorandum of understanding, but the depth of the relationship today is fundamentally different.

Throughout the 2010s, Australia and the Philippines increasingly co-operated on counter-terrorism operations, particularly in response to ISIS-affiliated terrorist groups in the southern Philippines. That co-operation has since expanded, with maritime security becoming a central focus. This was reflected in the 2023 Strategic Partnership and has continued through activities such as the amphibious military Exercise Alon and Australia’s provision of aerial and underwater drone capabilities to the Philippine Coast Guard.

It is a common misconception that the defence of Australia begins at its shorelines. That if you can protect the land, you can keep Australians safe. This has always been a fallacy. Since Federation, Australian strategists have recognised that Australia’s dependence on maritime trade is one of its greatest vulnerabilities.

More than 99 per cent of Australia’s international trade by volume moves by sea. But it is not just the volume that matters. It is what those goods represent.

From fuel to fertiliser and pharmaceuticals, these are the critical supplies that keep Australia’s economy functioning and enable its defence.

Think of Australia as a living organism with some of its vital organs outside its body. To defeat Australia, an adversary does not necessarily need to invade or attack the mainland. It could instead seek to cut off the maritime supplies on which the country depends.

China’s growing ability to control access to these waters has serious implications for regional maritime stability and the security of Australia’s maritime trade.

For Australia to protect its maritime interests, it needs not only a strong navy capable of projecting force across the maritime domain, but also strong regional relationships.

In the early years after Federation, Australia looked to Britain, and increasingly to the United States after the Second World War, to help secure the maritime domain and protect its vital trade routes. But the region has changed. Decolonisation has fundamentally changed the region’s strategic landscape, and Australia’s relationships with countries across it, from Indonesia to the Pacific Island nations, are critical to our defence.

The Philippines and our defence relationship with it sit at the heart of this. Its geography makes it a major player in the South China Sea, through which approximately two-thirds of Australia’s goods trade by tonnage passes.

Perhaps even more significantly, the Philippines is on the frontline of two critical strategic challenges.

The first is the increasingly contested South China Sea. While the world’s attention has been focused on the Middle East, the war with Iran and attacks on civilian shipping, China has continued to expand the operations of its coast guard, militarised fishing vessels known as its maritime militia and increasingly its navy, in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, this zone extends up to 200 nautical miles from the Philippine coast, giving the Philippines sovereign rights over its natural resources.

Despite the clarity of international law, reaffirmed by a 2016 international arbitral tribunal ruling, China continues to assert sweeping claims across much of the South China Sea, including waters within the exclusive economic zones of Southeast Asian coastal states such as Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and the Philippines.

China’s growing ability to control access to these waters, and its willingness to disregard international law through increasingly aggressive measures, including the ramming of Philippine Government vessels within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, the use of water cannons against vessels and the harassment of Australian military assets over several years in the South China Sea and Northeast Asia, have serious implications for regional maritime stability and the security of Australia’s maritime trade.

In a crisis or conflict, a strong Philippines, capable of restricting the ability of China’s navy, would be critical to Australia’s defence.

The second is a lesson from World War II. The security of the Philippines is critical to the balance of maritime power in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. Its position along the first island chain, including the strategically important Luzon Strait between the northern Philippine island of Luzon and Taiwan, makes it particularly important in constraining China’s access to the wider Pacific.

In a crisis or conflict, a strong Philippines, capable of restricting the ability of China’s navy, the largest in the world by number of ships, to dominate maritime Southeast Asia and operate freely in the Western Pacific, would be critical to Australia’s defence. As we saw during the war, Japan’s advance through Southeast Asia, including its capture of the Philippines, helped place Australia under direct threat.

Australia’s signing of the Defence Co-operation Arrangement is not only a vital update to the relationship, but also a recognition that Australia’s defence does not begin at its shorelines. Its dependence on maritime trade and a stable maritime region make the Australia–Philippines relationship critical to our own defence.

This is a lightly edited version of an article originally published in The Australian.

Article reprinted with permission from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's analysis and commentary site The Strategist.