Six days before Russian drones entered Polish airspace on September 9, a US B-2 stealth bomber flew across the North Atlantic and sank a target ship as part of military drills, escorted to its target by Norwegian F-35 stealth jets.
The US military first publicised the use of precision laser-guided bombs against warships during 2024’s “Rim of the Pacific” military drills, sinking the former US Navy assault ship Tarawa. This was widely seen as a not-so-subtle warning of America’s ability to destroy Chinese aircraft carriers and landing craft in the event of any conflict or Taiwan invasion.
This time, the demonstration took place in the Kremlin’s backyard where the Atlantic meets the Arctic, with Washington’s newest and largest aircraft carrier, the Gerald Ford, also exercising in the region.
There were also a host of other NATO-led military drills in mainland Europe designed in part to coincide with Russia’s own “Zapad” exercise taking place in Belarus.
Such deliberate shows of force have long been used by the Pentagon to showcase US military might, reassure allies and keep foes deterred – but it is a strategy that may now be yielding diminishing effects.
By sending drones into Poland and then jets into Estonian airspace a few days later, Russia has left NATO battling suggestions that it lacks both the will and resources to keep Europe properly defended.
It is a narrative further fueled by the appearance of multiple unidentified drones over multiple airports and other locations in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and beyond – and, perhaps equally seriously, jitters among European and Pacific allies that the US no longer stands fully behind its long-term partners.
Appalled by the White House dressing-down of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy earlier in the year, almost all of America's allies have worried they might find themselves similarly treated in a crisis.
They are now awaiting the results of a major Pentagon posture review that had been expected to be published in September. It is widely reported to prioritise homeland defence and confronting China – but with little official clarity yet on what that genuinely means.
China too is increasing its own use of such so-called hybrid tactics, continually stepping up military operations around Taiwan and disputed waters with other nations.
This month, Beijing declared the disputed Scarborough Shoal to be a Chinese “nature reserve”, ignoring a US-backed United Nations maritime court ruling that declared this atoll to be part of the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone.
On Tuesday, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and President Donald Trump addressed several hundred top US military commanders in Quantico, Virginia, declaring that as the “Department for War” the Pentagon will be focused ruthlessly on being prepared to fight and win in any future conflict.
While much of that speech focused on tightening standards for fitness and appearance and removing woke policies, Hegseth also argued that the new generation of military leaders – himself included – had learned the lessons of America’s unsuccessful “forever wars” and the “war on terror”, favouring a much tighter focus and more straightforward objectives.
"We have to be prepared for war, not for defence," Hegseth told the senior commanders as he outlined that thinking in more detail. "We fight wars to win, not to defend. Defence is something you do all the time. It's inherently reactionary and can lead to overuse, overreach and mission creep. War is something to do sparingly on our own terms and with clear aims...we unleash overwhelming and punishing violence on the enemy."
Amid mounting tensions with both Moscow and Beijing, most major US allies are also stepping up preparations for major warfare. The challenge, however, is that Russia and China are also simultaneously working to achieve their ends through means just short of conflict – with suspected Russian drone incursions this week just the latest example.
"The idea of a hybrid war is to threaten us, to divide us, to destabilise us," Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen told the Financial Times this week as EU leaders gathered in Copenhagen.
"To use drones one day, cyberattacks the next day, sabotage on the third day" - such incidents could not be stopped simply by building up defence capabilities to fight a major war, she said.
Initially at least, US and allied commanders appeared to believe that they could use the incursion of roughly two dozen Russian drones into Polish airspace on September 9 as a way to showcase allied unity.
Several of the drones were shot down by patrolling NATO aircraft, with the alliance swiftly announcing a stepped-up air defence mission known as “Eastern Sentry”.
Speaking shortly after a visit to Lithuania, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, US Air Force General Alexus Grynkewich – also America’s top commander on the continent – painted that response as a sign the alliance system is working as it should, comparing the new stepped-up surveillance mission to NATO’s “Baltic Sentry” launched last year.
That operation, established by Grynkewich’s predecessor General Chris Cavoli, was set up in response to the severing of several undersea Baltic cables during 2024.
NATO and US officials view that mission, which has used almost exclusively European drones, ships and planes, as successful – not least because not a single Baltic cable has been cut in 2025.
When it came to “Eastern Sentry”, though, the Kremlin was quick to test its response, sending three MiG-31 jets into Estonian coastal airspace for what local authorities said was a 12-minute incursion. The Russian aircraft were met by Italian NATO jets that escorted them until they re-entered international airspace, but did not attempt to fire.
The Kremlin denied the Russian aircraft had entered NATO airspace – but within the alliance itself, the incident swiftly prompted a range of sometimes public disagreements over whether or not a tougher line was needed.
Such disagreements risk becoming a sign that, “NATO isn’t working properly,” Danish national security academic and alliance historian Sten Rynning suggested earlier this month. The principal issue, he said, was that under Trump the US was no longer providing the clear and decisive leadership and force European nations have become used to during prior decades.
That, in turn, has further ramped up already growing worries that the alliance in general and US in particular might struggle to respond if Russian leader Vladimir Putin or one of his successors launches a limited land grab into Eastern Europe, perhaps to take the majority Russian-speaking city of Narva on Estonia’s eastern border with Russia, or one of several sparsely populated islands in the Baltic.
Some European officials suggest the incursions into NATO airspace in September may ironically have given nations there just the impetus they need to bolster their defences.
Wednesday’s meeting in Copenhagen saw multiple European leaders talk of the need to step up in the face of mounting confrontation with the Kremlin.
For all Russia’s recent posturing, its military and economy have been hugely stretched by its war in Ukraine, and even with only limited US long-term commitment to European defence the combined human and industrial resources of the EU and Ukraine itself should offer significant deterrence.
That might change in the event of government changes in major nations particularly Germany and France, with conservative parties increasingly seen as likely to win future elections.
Last weekend, however, saw Kremlin-linked elements firmly defeated in elections in Moldova, a development described by European officials as a clear sign of the limits of Putin’s power.
Ironically, that leaves worries that the greatest threat to European peace may come from the Pacific, where China is stepping up its own efforts to intimidate at least as much as Russia – and where US efforts to maintain deterrence again risk being outflanked.
“In terms of a major conflict, I do not think we will see one unless America and China fight,” former head of the Danish Navy Nils Wang told this columnist this week. He warned that any Chinese invasion of Taiwan might well be accompanied by a Russian offensive against European NATO members. “If that happens, I think we (NATO and Russia) will fight each other.”
While the Baltic cable networks have survived the year without being attacked, Taiwan reports its undersea connections have continued to be cut while China’s naval efforts to intimidate both Taiwan and the Philippines are also still increasing.
With Trump due to meet Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping later in the year, many in the region worry that a potential US-Chinese deal on trade and resources might give Beijing the impression it has a free hand to ramp up such efforts at intimidation provided it remains short of all-out war.
US deterrence efforts this year include the recent deployment to Japan of a long-range Typhon missile system as well as heavy investment in unmanned weapons systems and the holding of multiple regional military exercises.
Reports from Washington also suggest the US will continue to push ahead with its AUKUS submarine deal with Australia despite repeated rumours of it being cancelled.
All are intended to give Beijing second thoughts when it comes to military action.
A preliminary classified Pentagon policy summary earlier this year described deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as the top US concern. But that is unlikely to be enough to stop China pushing ahead with other efforts at intimidation – or perhaps even attempting to blockade Taiwan or other foes.
Speaking to his top commanders, Trump claimed the adoption of the name “Department of Defense” under the Truman administration was the start of the US turning woke. He and those around him hope focusing more on winning wars will stop such future conflicts. The world, however, could yet prove much more complex.
(By Peter Apps; editing by Mark Heinrich)