South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has pulled off a diplomatic coup by persuading US President Donald Trump not only to assist South Korea’s nuclear submarine ambitions, but to abandon decades of US resistance to Seoul applying nuclear power for military purposes.
Among the news from this week’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Gyeongju, South Korea, Trump’s October 30 announcement that he had approved South Korea’s request to construct nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) with US technical assistance was the most surprising.
Australians have agonised over the possibility that Trump would reject AUKUS and its support for Australian SSNs as a legacy of Joe Biden’s presidency. But Lee had the cunning to realise the reverse possibility, that Trump could be persuaded to repeat the nuclear technology transfer grand-bargain formula in his own name with another ally—and not necessarily its most trusted one at that.
Immediate Australian media interest in this remarkable turn of events focused on possible implications for AUKUS Pillar One, the part of the Australian, UK and US technology partnership that covers SSNs.
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese quickly and effectively dispelled speculation that South Korea’s nuclear submarine program could merge with AUKUS. He was emphatic that it would proceed separately.
South Korea’s nuclear submarine ambitions date back at least 20 years, but progress has been fitful because the navy is not the dominant service in South Korea’s armed forces and because conservative administrations have not been keen on acquiring SSNs. The desire for them is oddly associated with leftist governments in South Korea, partly because of their distrust of the army.
That inclination is currently pronounced because of army support for the brief declaration of martial law by Lee’s disgraced conservative predecessor, President Yoon Suk Yeol, in December.
The main reason for South Korea’s working with the United States appears to be obtaining nuclear fuel.
The case for South Korea to acquire SSNs, to exploit great submerged endurance in hunting North Korean submarines, is weak.
SSNs are best suited to sea control and power projection over long distances, where their combination of speed, endurance and size helps to justify their enormous cost. This increases suspicions that South Korea’s interest in SSNs is a stalking horse for acquiring nuclear weapons and secure platforms from which to deliver them.
The submarine deal, as outlined by South Korean media and Trump, raises many questions, and it may evolve in form considerably.
The main reason for South Korea’s working with the United States appears to be obtaining nuclear fuel, as well as political legitimacy from Washington. This would override an agreement with the US restricting South Korean nuclear fuel enrichment (only with US permission and to less than 20 per cent) and Seoul’s obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Assuming South Korea’s main interest is to obtain fuel from the US for its naval reactors, rather than a broader swathe of nuclear submarine technology, then the effect on AUKUS should be fairly limited. The program will still worsen the strain on Washington’s regulatory capacity, however.
The commitment to build the submarines in Philadelphia looks like a program weakness, however necessary it may have been for winning Trump’s support. The Hanwha Philly Shipyard has no special infrastructure for building nuclear boats, raising a risk that South Korea will need to lean on the already struggling US submarine industry. It may have to do so even if it sends South Korean workers and plant to the yard.
Imagine Australia’s embarrassment if South Korea’s subs are in the water before any from Adelaide.
From Lee’s perspective, the important thing has been gaining the US president’s approval to waive bilateral restrictions on nuclear power for South Korean military use. He’s done that by channelling Trump’s iconoclasm and desire to secure his own deals. Some changes will probably require congressional approval, but these are details to be negotiated, and Seoul knows how to bargain.
Overall, the deal appears unlikely to significantly disrupt the AUKUS Optimal Pathway timelines for getting SSNs into Australian service. And an infusion of skilled workers and capital from South Korea into the US could mitigate any disruption, under Lee’s proposed Make American Shipbuilding Great Again initiative, itself part of a wider pledge in July to invest US$350 billion in the US.
While AUKUS is not fundamentally threatened, Trump’s willingness to share the crown jewels of nuclear propulsion with an ally outside the Five Eyes does makes it less exclusive.
If Seoul presses ahead and constructs nuclear submarines in South Korea, it is likely to do so faster than Australia can, since it has a headstart in nuclear engineering, a greater supply of science and technology graduates, a much bigger defence industry and an active submarine construction base. Imagine Australia’s embarrassment if South Korea’s SSNs are in the water before any from Adelaide.
Meanwhile, Japan is likely to harbour significant reservations about South Korea acquiring nuclear propulsion for military purposes. Tokyo is probably masking its misgivings, to avoid a clash with Seoul as South Korea hosts APEC.
Privately, it will be extremely concerned and probably regards the deal as an unfriendly act by the Trump administration that undermines regional nuclear non-proliferation norms. For now, however, there is also very little Japan can do about it, other than to weigh its own options.
Article reprinted with permission from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's analysis and commentary site The Strategist.