This is a most interesting and informative book that is not just of relevance to Australians.
Citizens of most other western developed nations with any interest in matters naval would also find it useful and instructive. However, the book is not without its faults.
The author’s main theme describing the AUKUS nuclear submarine acquisition “fiasco” is inarguable, but to claim that it “sank Australia’s sovereignty” is nonsensical.
In reality, Australia has never been a sovereign nation with respect to defence (nor, of course, are most countries). Since its establishment as a British colonial settlement in 1788 until today, it has always depended upon Britain and, since 1942, the United States, for its ultimate defence.
The acquisition system, particularly Australia's, is culturally inadequate to the point of hopelessness.
Australia could never and still cannot defend itself against any major power that may decide to attack it. With its mineral and agricultural riches, it is something of a “plum, ripe for the picking”.
The AUKUS nuclear submarine acquisition is undoubtedly a “fiasco” and a very alarming one. However, it is not unusual. Since World War I, Australia’s warship acquisitions could very rarely be described as successful.
Apart from some notable successes during World War II, when the acquisition process was largely directed by very competent civilians, the outcomes have generally varied from disappointing to disastrous, particularly recently. The author would have been better to have researched that history more carefully.
As with numerous other countries, Australia’s defence acquisitions, particularly warship purchases, have always been hampered by a combination of irrational political interference; bureaucratic incompetence and naivety; senior military officer incompetence, overreach and negligence. All these were combined with an occasional whiff of corruption.
Since the days of Samuel Pepys, at least, it has always been thus. The acquisition system, particularly Australia’s, is culturally inadequate to the point of hopelessness. It needs urgent and very comprehensive reform.
Government acquisition has generally always compared disastrously with the private sector. Sure, private sector purchases can be disappointing, but they rarely result in the kinds of blunders or “fiascos” that are almost the norm with governments. Probably it has something to with the fact that “it isn’t their money” in the case of governments.
Of course, politicians are always looking to the next election and, in a federation like Australia, that complicates matters further.
Australia imports its aircraft complete, so why not submarines?
Many Australian politicians (and even those of other countries) find it very difficult to distinguish between warfare and welfare when making acquisition decisions. That becomes even more complex and difficult for them when local construction or manufacture is involved, as it will supposedly be in the case of the AUKUS subs, if they are ever built.
And, that is very unlikely. The very idea of trying to build nuclear-powered submarines at ASC in Adelaide is incomprehensible given that government-owned company’s appalling record to date.
The author’s ”blame game” also seems unfair and unreasonable. For all his many faults, former Prime Minister Scott Morrison is far from being the sole villain in this drama, nor was his not very competent predecessor, Malcolm Turnbull, much of a contributor of common sense decision-making.
Turnbull's intrigues with the French over the proposed Attack-class subs were silly and resulted in hurt to both sides. His cancelling of his predecessor Tony Abbott’s earlier and wise order for submarines from Japan was spiteful and ridiculously wasteful. It largely resulted in the mess in which Australia now finds itself with respect to submarines.
The author, however, rather indirectly alludes to the better solution to the current fiasco being returning to the French for a presumably sooner delivered and less expensive fleet of nuclear subs for Australia.
Given the current state of American and British submarine building, that would seem to be the most realistic solution especially if Australia can avoid the usual impractical, expensive, and dishonest demands for local content and construction. Australia imports its aircraft complete, so why not submarines?
It may only be a thin book but it is well worth reading.
Author: Andrew Fowler
Available from Melbourne University Publishing, Melbourne, Australia
Web: www.mup.com.au