One factor should dominate global strategic policymaking today: that the Strait of Hormuz will re-open only with the consent of the Iranian Government. No amount of US naval power can either force passage or safeguard transit.
So, Raelene Lockhorst’s Strategist article on March 9 on the effect of its closure on Australia should be taken with deadly seriousness, now, by Australian policy makers.
On the surface, access through the Strait of Hormuz appears to be a naval challenge. And on the surface, the United States Navy has the upper hand. It has almost a fifth of its carrier fleet in the region—the USS Abraham Lincoln and the USS Gerald R Ford—plus a huge escort force.
The US military can eliminate all Iranian maritime activity. To date, it appears to have sunk 30 Iranian vessels.
But in naval doctrine, sea denial is one thing; sea control is quite another.
The problem is this: the US Navy can deny the Iranians the ability to operate on the waters of the strait—or anywhere for that matter—but the US Navy cannot control the strait itself. Iran can deploy cheap anti-ship weaponry along the littoral of the strait with far greater ease and assurance than modern naval forces can reliably counter them. Dumb mass will defeat cutting-edge quality.
On March 12, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright said the US Navy would probably start escorting merchant ships through the strait this month. This will hardly be sustainable: the interceptor cells and anti-missile gun magazines on US destroyers and frigates will empty more rapidly and expensively than Iranian arsenals.
Iran’s task is not militarily taxing, anyway. Iran needs only to target the tankers, which can be hit with little accuracy. Iran’s forces can ignore the escorts. Just a few hits on a few tankers are enough to force mercantile insurers to bail out.
According to Britain’s Maritime Trade Operations Centre, Iran has so far attacked 16 vessels in the strait, the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Gulf. The strait is effectively closed.
There is no defensible line that US forces could ever secure.
Given the strong tides through the strait, Iran can also float mines into the waters from various points on the littoral. It doesn’t have to load them onto mine-laying vessels (16 of which the US claims to have sunk).
So, in the unlikely event the US Navy did attempt convoy, it would first need to destroy land-based anti-ship capabilities and operations on the Iranian side of the strait.
It’s at this point the Dardanelles analogy becomes operative. The only reason the Gallipoli campaign was attempted in 1915 was because the most powerful navies of the day had failed to force a passage through the narrow Dardanelles, the shores of which were controlled by Ottoman forces. In this case, even 18 battleships—including HMS Queen Elizabeth, with her 381mm guns—failed to sufficiently suppress defensive artillery.
In constricted waters, the combination of basic artillery and basic naval mines inflicted such damage on the world’s most advanced navy and its French ally that they had to retire.
So, an attempt to force passage will present the United States with the same fallback option that Britain and France had in 1915: to take the littoral by force. But occupying the Gallipoli peninsular doesn’t begin to compare with occupying more than 150 kilometres of Iranian shoreline, from Qeshm island in the west to the Port of Bandar Abas and down the coast to Koo Mobarak, where the strait widens.
There is no defensible line that US forces could ever secure. The attempt would be Gallipoli times 10, with the difference that the Iranians could always pull back to interior lines of defence. It is inconceivable that the US would try.
The war will not be over when the US stops bombing; it will be over when Iran allows free passage through the strait.
Are there alternatives? US air forces could continue to reduce Iran’s ability to make drones and missiles. But even if that works, there are substitutes.
Russia has every incentive to keep the strait closed, since its own hydrocarbons are becoming more valuable with every passing day. Russia is strategically on-side with Iran’s actions.
Russia also has the kit to help. It has spent four years contracting the development cycles of cheap drones and non-smart missiles. It can fly or ship hundreds of such munitions across the Caspian Sea. Even if US drones could interdict passage, an attempt would constitute a direct attack on Russian forces. So that won’t happen either.
Consequently, Iran is in a far stronger position than might appear. It just has to persist—while the damage to Asian and European economies accumulates. As a huge energy exporter, the US has autarkic options; Asia and Europe do not. This means the US is in a far stronger position too, compared with its beleaguered allies.
And so back to Lockhorst’s analysis. Australia should start planning now for restricted supply of essential fuels. The war will not be over when the US stops bombing; it will be over when Iran allows free passage through the Strait of Hormuz.
And there is nothing the US military can do to change that equation.
Article reprinted with permission from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's analysis and commentary site The Strategist.