We would scarcely be human, if we were not becoming twitchy about the multitude of vulnerabilities we face in these uncertain times. There is a power cut, or as happened last week, half the trains in the country ground to a halt and instead of shrugging and looking for candles and alternative means of transport, you think about very nasty alternative reasons for the outage.
There may be a simple explanation – it was, in fact, a tree over the power lines and some twit had mucked around with the signalling software on the railway, but it does not stop the nagging doubt, in the back of your mind, that this might be the beginning of something worse.
Every year there are between 150 and 200 cable faults that require urgent repair, on average about three per week.
Because there can be no argument about the extraordinary vulnerabilities, modern civilisation really does face because of their dependence upon technology. We are reminded regularly of the presence of malign players seeking to attack our banking, communications, medical systems, etc, with a growing assumption that these are orchestrated by states that bear us no goodwill, even if the hackers are freelancers.
In the maritime world, the suspicious damage to undersea cables only serves to underline our dependence on an infrastructure that is more fragile than we might have assumed.
So it is notable that the International Telecommunications Union is on the case and has established an offshoot of its International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) to “make resilience a global imperative”. The new group of forty nations, in the International Advisory Body for Submarine Cable Protection, will presumably attempt to live up to its name, although in these febrile times, it might find it a more difficult task, with 99 per cent of international data exchange running though this amazing network.
They offer a certain amount of reassurance, pointing out that the primary causes of damaged cables tend to be accidental human activities, from fishing trawls, anchors, and the like, although there are plenty of natural hazards under the sea surface. While we might be reading nervously about Chinese bulkers allegedly cutting cables in the Baltic, the ICPC notes that every year there are between 150 and 200 cable faults that require urgent repair, on average about three per week.
The sheer magnitude of the task of protecting the cables, with a finite number of suitable craft available from the various navies, is mind-boggling.
You only have to look at a chart of the Baltic or North Sea to see the number of busy shipping routes and fishing grounds in the vicinity of these vital links. Short of prohibiting all fishing and welding up ships’ anchors, it is difficult to see how resilience can be enhanced. Perhaps increasing the clarity of advice on prohibited areas might be a good start.
However, it is clearly not mindless paranoia that has seen a huge amount of naval interest in the protection of the cables and pipelines upon which we so increasingly depend. As part of the “hybrid” hostilities we are becoming accustomed to, there are frequent alarms about mysterious suspicious ship activities over important cables, with “research ships” hovering around in the vicinity until naval patrols scare them away.
It is suggested that the Russians have sophisticated submarine craft that could destroy these links almost at will, while the sheer magnitude of the task of protecting the cables, with a finite number of suitable craft available from the various navies, is mind-boggling.
It might be suggested that to induce a certain degree of paranoia, a hostile state really does not have to do a great deal. “Accidents” can happen with anchors or fishing gear, while merely cruising around in international waters in a craft with “research” inscribed on its upperworks, steaming slowly along a cable line or heaving to in an inexplicable fashion, without actually doing anything, is a cheap way of worrying your enemy in these undeclared hostilities. There are also countless numbers of fishing craft that can be employed as auxiliaries to increase the tempo of your adversaries’ concern.
If we were really intent on increased resilience in the face of these threats, we maybe ought to be thinking of lessening, rather than increasing our dependence upon these fragile arteries. But that, as they say, is a whole new ball game.