In an earlier column, I mentioned that there would be updates to the Portland Bay report published by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), and I am grateful to Vik Chaudhri of ATSB for letting me know that updates have been published.
They are mainly in the form of responses to the report by other involved parties, and I believe they are worth mentioning in my final words on this topic.
Readers will recall that the bulk carrier Portland Bay suffered engine problems in a severe storm while she was about 12 nautical miles off the coast of New South Wales in early July 2022. She started to drift towards the coast in gale force winds and a heavy swell. Three harbour tugs went to her assistance but they were not really suitable and, despite the bravery of their crews, the casualty ended up being held by her anchors about one mile offshore.
Finally, the state’s nominated emergency towing vessel, Svitzer Glenrock, arrived and towed the casualty to Port Botany.
The ATSB report was critical of NSW Maritime, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), the managers and the salvors in the case. To me, the criticisms seemed justified, but now we have a chance to study the responses of some of the parties, and they are so convoluted I have compressed them to their bare bones.
On the assertion that AMSA’s procedures were not effectively implemented since there was a 12-hour delay in tasking Svitzer Glenrock, "which significantly prolonged the emergency", AMSA said it did not agree.
However, since the incident, the agency has conducted lots of reviews and evaluations. Whilst welcoming these initiatives, ATSB said AMSA did not go far enough and recommended further safety actions.
Finally, AMSA accepted the recommendations and promised to do better in future. All this took many pages when a simple acknowledgement of the errors and a promise to improve might have saved the Australian taxpayer huge amounts of money, and avoided having armies of civil servants tied up for months producing tedious reams of paper.
Apparently, the threat of massive potential pollution was not enough to persuade the port authority to stir themselves or admit any errors.
AMSA was also criticised for its inefficiency in issuing directions allowing the ship into Port Botany, which increased the risk, and for lacking the required understanding of their central role in any response.
This was inconsistent with the National Plan principles of a single, integrated and comprehensive response and significantly prolonged the emergency. Again, AMSA wriggled and initially denied any wrongdoing, before finally taking some measures that ATSB found acceptable.
The story was much the same in the case of the Port Authority of New South Wales, which was criticised for not effectively implementing procedures, thus resulting in delays. The port authority people justified their lack of response by saying their roles and responsibilities were limited to responding to pollution, and there was none in this case.
Apparently, the threat of massive potential pollution was not enough to persuade them to stir themselves or admit any errors. Obviously, the act that defines their roles and responsibilities may not be fit for purpose, but I doubt it will be modified anytime soon.
Some of ATSB’s strongest criticism was aimed at United Salvage, which was said to have been limited in its ability to provide the required salvage services, since it did not own or operate any suitable tugs – a fact that was not made clearly known to the owners or managers of the casualty, or to the authorities involved.
The response from United Salvage had all the hallmarks of being written by a lawyer, and stated that the company mobilised with the intent of providing its "best endeavours" to assist Portland Bay with available towage assets. To quote a maritime phrase, this sounds, in my opinion, like utter rowlocks.
ATSB responded that a professional salvor, "should ensure that suitable towage assets are readily available….to provide the salvage services required and expected." United Salvage disagreed, so ATSB closed the issue as "not addressed."
This is an abysmal response from United Salvage, in my opinion, and possibly opens the door to calls for a revision to Lloyd’s Open Form to specifically include the salvor having suitable assets to provide the salvage services required and expected.
As an island nation with a long and pristine coastline, Australia's preservation and protection is too important to be left to government committees.
Joining in the criticism of United Salvage is making me extremely uncomfortable. I have met their managing director, Drew Shannon, a number of times over the years and know him to be a professional and experienced salvor.
Perhaps there is something I am missing, in which case I would be delighted to stand corrected. But for the time being, the evidence does not really support an alternative conclusion.
Finally, ATSB criticised the vessel’s managers, Pacific Basin Shipping, for not providing the master with advice about notifying the authorities in accordance with the safety management system, and for focusing on getting the engines going instead. This, they say, probably led to the master delaying the notification and the request for tug assistance.
The response from Pacific Basin is exemplary. The company has revised its emergency procedures, conducted emergency drills outside normal office hours, sent a circular to the entire fleet to disseminate the lessons learned, and produced a training video using the incident as a case study.
"Collectively, the actions taken are assessed as having adequately addressed this safety issue," ATSB remarked in response to these steps.
So, only ATSB and Pacific Basin deserve praise in my opinion, and I find myself back where I started: Australia really needs a SOSREP! As an island nation with a long and pristine coastline, its preservation and protection is too important to be left to government committees.