The United Arab Emirates' withdrawal from OPEC is widely seen as lessening the clout of the producer group and initiating a race to boost output, ultimately resulting in sharply lower crude oil prices.
However, the US and Israeli war against Iran has upended global crude markets to such an extent that expecting what might otherwise seem the most obvious outcome is likely flawed thinking.
It may be the case that the UAE decision to leave the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries does substantially weaken the group, and there may ultimately be more crude supplied by the UAE once, or perhaps if, pre-war shipment volume resumes through the Strait of Hormuz. But these two outcomes are not the only possible consequences, nor are they as guaranteed as they may seem.
The first question is just how damaged OPEC is by the move. Losing the fourth-largest producer in the group is a blow.
An important fact is that the UAE, along with OPEC de facto leader Saudi Arabia, are the two exporters most able to ramp up production rapidly.
But the 65-year-old producer group has weathered departures before and still managed to remain relevant, and exercise influence over the supply - and therefore the price - of global crude oil. Angola left in 2024, Qatar in 2020, Ecuador for the second time also in 2020, Indonesia in 2016 and Gabon in 1995, although Gabon later rejoined.
It could be argued that none of these countries were as significant as the UAE, although Angola and Qatar would still count as major losses.
It would be a brave energy analyst to back a view that Saudi Arabia, along with OPEC+ member Russia, are weakened substantially because of the loss of a member that produced about 12 per cent of OPEC's output.
Much will depend on how Saudi Arabia and Russia respond and whether they decide to enter a volume and price war.
Such a move would not really be aimed at forcing the UAE to keep production discipline. It would more be aimed at pushing high-cost producers out of the market, with the primary target being US shale output.
While US President Donald Trump has welcomed the UAE decision to leave OPEC, the irony is that if the move does result in a volume and price war, it is US energy companies that will bear the brunt.
But the main question mark over the UAE move is whether this will indeed result in a volume and price war. The UAE was shipping about 3.3 million barrels per day (bpd) prior to the February 28 US and Israeli attacks on Iran and the resulting effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
Most analysts estimate that the UAE could increase fairly rapidly to 4.5 million bpd and hit five million bpd in the medium term. This of course assumes that the Strait of Hormuz is fully and sustainably re-opened at some point, which given the current trajectory of the conflict and the seeming lack of progress between the warring parties is far from certain.
But even assuming the strait returns to pre-war flows, at least for crude oil, will the extra barrels that the UAE may supply be enough to spark a significant price correction? Much depends not only on what other exporters do, but also on what tactics importers adopt.
Do importers try to rebuild depleted inventories as rapidly as possible, fearful of another Middle East conflict, or do they take a measured approach in the expectation of moderating prices? China, the world's biggest crude importer, has traditionally built stockpiles up during periods of low prices and cut imports when prices rise to levels its refiners view as too high.
Will China even bother restocking given it has not used much of its massive inventories, estimated to be at least 1.2 billion barrels. US crude exports are likely to fall back once the Strait of Hormuz is fully open, but how rapidly it will rebuild inventories is less certain.
There are also questions as to how quickly production in the Middle East can return to pre-war levels, given that fields have been shut and facilities damaged by drones and missiles.
Simply put, the Iran conflict has created too many variables, meaning that any conclusions on how the UAE withdrawal from OPEC will affect the group and the wider supply-demand balance carry an unusually high degree of uncertainty.
(By Clyde Russell; Editing by Christopher Cushing)