Competing national claims for sovereignty over the Spratly islands and adjacent areas of the South China Sea are both complex and politically sensitive.

The past twenty years have seen regular moves by Beijing to assert its claims, although Chinese strategy has been fairly cautious and incremental in nature. For instance, China's initial encroachment on Mischief Reef, situated 210 kilometres off the Philippine province of Palawan, began in 1998 with the installation of buoys and navigation markers, many of which were subsequently removed by the Philippine authorities.

In subsequent years however, and despite impotent protests from the Philippines,  China built a large outpost on the reef, equipped with radar, communications antennae, fuel tanks, gun emplacements and accommodation blocks.

Unsurprisingly, the prime target for Chinese pressure in the Spratlys continues to be the militarily weak Philippines. The latest example of Beijing seizing the initiative over a Manila-claimed outcrop occured in early April, when China respond forcefully to the attempted interdiction of ten Chinese fishing vessels off Scarborough Shoal by the Philippine Navy's (PN) large ex-US Coast Guard (USCG) cutter 'Gregorio del Pilar'.

Scarborough Shoal is situated some 215 kilometres West of Luzon.  According to Philippine media reports, the fishing vessels were heavily loaded with illegally fished sharks and clams as well as protected corals.

'Zhong Guo 75', and 'Zhong Guo 84', both patrol vessels of the China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) paramilitary force, reportedly obstructed Gregorio del Pilar as it closed on the fishing vessels. A stand off ensued, and since then both sides have maintained a substantial vessel presence near the shoal. 

So far, actions from both sides have been fairly low-key. Beijing is relying upon non-military vessels rather than PLA Navy warships to back up its claims. Manila, for its part, has replaced the 'Gregorio del Pilar' with the Australian-built Philippine Coast Guard search and rescue ships 'Pampanga' and 'Edsa II'. Reportedly, Chinese fishing vessels have returned to the scene, and a Philippine fishery research vessel is now also nearby.

Some analysts believe that Beijing may be calculating that if it can get its way over Scarborough Shoal, which is relatively remote from the Chinese mainland, it can safely proceed rapidly with claims to other islets and sea areas much nearer to China.

Another factor which may add urgency to China's current tactics is Manila's programme to upgrade its naval capability from its present low level. Already in the pipeline for the PN are at least two more ex-USCG cutters, three maritime helicopters, a trio of new fast assault craft and, possibly, a number of ex-Japan Coast Guard patrol ships.

There has been no confirmation of reports of a PLAN flotilla heading for Scarborough Shoal. There are growing fears, however, that a very long drawn out confrontation with serious escalatory potential might be in the offing.  

Both rival Spratly claimant nations along with the United States could potentially be obliged to respond to such an escalation. Washington DC has announced both a shift of strategic focus to Asian waters and re-emphasised its alliance with Manila. Significantly, the Americans raised the profile of this year's US-Philippines joint naval exercises. These exercises featured amphibious warfare and took place off Palawan in an area adjacent to a Philippine-garrisoned Spratly islands group.   

Planned regional moves by the Americans, moves which appear to be aimed at containing Chinese maritime expansion, include: basing surface ships and submarines in Brisbane, a Marine Corps expeditionary force in Darwin, maritime patrol aircraft and surveillance drones in the Cocos Islands and four littoral combat ships in Singapore. 

Trevor Hollingsbee

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